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DYNAMIC PROPERTY TAXES AND
RACIAL GENTRIFICATION
Andrew T. Hayashi*
Many jurisdictions determine real property taxes based on a combination of current market
values and the recent history of market values, introducing a dynamic aspect to property taxes.
By design, homes in rapidly appreciating neighborhoods enjoy lower tax rates than homes in other
areas. Since growth in home prices is correlated with—and may be caused by—changing neighborhood demographics, dynamic property taxes will generally have racially disparate impacts.
These impacts may explain why minority-owned homes tend to be taxed at higher rates. Moreover, the dynamic features of local property taxes may subsidize gentrification and racially discriminatory preferences.

INTRODUCTION
Although housing prices can fluctuate dramatically from year to year,
real property taxes generally do not. This is because property owners are
taxed on their property’s assessed value, and assessed values typically do not
move in lockstep with the property’s fair market value. Instead, in many
jurisdictions, a property’s assessed value is a function of both the property’s
current value and its value in prior years. As a result, two properties worth
the same amount today may be taxed at different rates depending on the
evolution of the properties’ values over time. Property taxes that depend on
the history of a property’s values are dynamic property taxes.
For example, many jurisdictions limit the rate at which a property’s
assessed value can increase over a period of years (a “cap”). For example,
consider a home in New York City valued at $800,000 in 2020, increasing in
value to $860,000 in 2021. The property’s assessed value in 2021 will only be
$848,000 because its assessed value cannot increase by more than 6% in any
© 2021 Andrew T. Hayashi. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Essay in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes,
so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
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one year.1 In other jurisdictions, properties are reappraised only every few
years, and any increase in a property’s value between appraisals is added to
the property’s assessed value in increments (a “phase-in”). Consider a home
in Maryland valued at $860,000 in 2021, valued at $800,000 when it was last
assessed in 2018.2 The property’s assessed value will be $820,000 in 2021,
$840,000 in 2022, and $860,000 in 2023.
Caps and phase-ins reduce the assessment ratio (assessed value as a share
of market value) for a rapidly appreciating property. Because taxes are based
on assessed values, caps and phase-ins therefore reduce the effective tax rate
(ETR) for such a property.3 The result is that rapidly appreciating homes
have lower ETRs compared to properties with stable values, declining values,
or only modest growth rates.
I have written elsewhere about the advantages and disadvantages of caps,
arguing that they either do not achieve their objectives or do so at too great a
cost.4 In this Essay, I focus on the beneficiaries of caps and phase-ins and
how the evolution of a neighborhood’s racial composition interacts with
dynamic property taxes to affect the property tax incidence. Home prices
reflect (among other things) racial preferences for neighbors, which typically
manifests as a valuation penalty in predominantly minority neighborhoods. 5
Since property taxes are based on home prices, racial preferences influence
property taxes. When home prices are stable, ETRs should be roughly constant across neighborhoods, including both those that are predominantly
white and those that are composed mostly of racial minorities. But when
home prices are changing, ETRs under a dynamic property tax will vary
across neighborhoods. When these changes result from the interaction of
racial preferences and the re-sorting of households across neighborhoods—
such as in the case of gentrification—dynamic property taxes have racially
disparate impacts.6
These impacts are nuanced and contingent on empirical facts about the
incidence of dynamic property taxes and the process of neighborhood
1 This example assumes that the residential property is in property Tax Class 1. Determining Your Assessed Value, N.Y.C. DEP’T OF FIN., https://www1.nyc.gov/site/finance/taxes/
property-determining-your-assessed-value.page (last visited Mar. 2, 2021).
2 In Maryland, properties are reassessed every three years. MD. CODE ANN.,
TAX–PROP. § 8-104(b)(1) (West 2021).
3 The effective property tax rate is the tax divided by the property’s market value.
4 Andrew T. Hayashi, Property Taxes and Their Limits: Evidence from New York City, 25
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 33 (2014). For a discussion of some of the general issues created by
property tax limits, see Joan M. Youngman, The Variety of Property Tax Limits: Goals, Consequences, and Alternatives, 46 STATE TAX NOTES 541 (2007). On the property tax generally,
see JOAN YOUNGMAN, A GOOD TAX: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES FOR THE PROPERTY TAX IN THE
UNITED STATES (2016).
5 See infra Section II.A.
6 Although I do not discuss it here, there is a long history of property tax discrimination against black homeowners. See generally Andrew W. Kahrl, The Power to Destroy: Discriminatory Property Assessments and the Struggle for Tax Justice in Mississippi, 82 J.S. HIST. 579
(2016).
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change. In Part II, I describe conditions under which dynamic property taxes
result in higher ETRs for black homeowners than white homeowners during
a period of gentrification. This result may partially explain evidence that
black homeowners face higher ETRs than similarly situated white homeowners, a fact that has been attributed to the overvaluation of black-owned
properties.7 If dynamic property taxes—not overvaluation—are why black
homeowners have higher property taxes than white homeowners, then the
remedy lies in the elimination of assessment caps and phase-ins rather than
more accurate valuation methodologies.
Seeing the relationship between dynamic property taxes and gentrification also reveals a problem. By lowering the ETR for rapidly appreciating
homes, dynamic property taxes subsidize investments and processes that lead
to rapid appreciation. The displacement of minority residents by white
residents in a neighborhood is one such process, so dynamic property taxes
subsidize gentrification and the racial preferences that are associated with it.
I. KEY FEATURES

OF

DYNAMIC PROPERTY TAXES

Evaluating the effects of dynamic property taxes requires specifying a
baseline against which to measure those effects. Current-value taxation
serves as an intuitive and justifiable baseline that has both efficient and equitable properties.8 Property values reflect local amenities and public goods—
such as schools and public parks—and the expected provision of those goods
in the future. A tax based on current property values captures the benefits of
these public goods to the extent they are capitalized in home prices and, in
this respect, operates as an efficient user fee. If home prices are correlated
with homeowner wealth, then taxing homeowners based on home values is
also reasonably equitable and allocates the local tax burden according to
homeowners’ ability to bear the costs of government. Against this baseline,
dynamic property taxes lower ETRs on appreciating properties, taxing them
less than properties with more stable values. But determining who actually
benefits from dynamic property taxes depends on key design features of the
tax.

7 Andrew Van Dam, Black Families Pay Significantly Higher Property Taxes than White Families, New Analysis Shows, WASH. POST (July 2, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/07/02/black-property-tax/ (discussing Carlos Avenancio-León & Troup
Howard, The Assessment Gap: Racial Inequalities in Property Taxation (Mar. 31, 2020)
(unpublished manuscript) (https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3465010)). Conversely,
when it comes to valuation for refinancing purposes, black-owned homes are often undervalued. Debra Kamin, Black Homeowners Face Discrimination in Appraisals, N.Y. TIMES, (Aug.
27, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/25/realestate/blacks-minorities-appraisalsdiscrimination.html.
8 One could also take into account characteristics of the homeowners, and many
jurisdictions do provide partial exemptions for veterans, the disabled, and senior citizens.
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A. Caps and Phase-Ins
The first key feature of a dynamic property tax is whether it employs caps
or phase-ins. Assessment caps lower ETRs on properties that appreciate at a
rate higher than the annual cap. For example, New York City’s caps prevent
assessments from increasing more than 6% annually or 20% over five years.9
The five-year cap corresponds to an annualized rate of price growth of a little
over 3.7%. 10 The cap confers no benefit for properties that appreciate at a
rate below the cap. By contrast, phase-ins benefit all appreciating properties
because any increase in market value between assessment years is added to
the assessed value incrementally.
A second difference between caps and phase-ins is how they affect ETRs
in a period of price stability or decline after a run-up in housing prices. In
the case of caps, the appreciation accrued during the run-up may require a
long period of subsequent price stability before assessed values converge to
fair market values. In the case of phase-ins, by contrast, all of the gain that
accrues during a housing price run-up is fully reflected in assessment ratios
by the second assessment period after the boom ends.
Summarizing the differences, caps tend to benefit the fastest appreciating neighborhoods for a relatively long time. In contrast, phase-ins benefit
all appreciating neighborhoods, but the benefits tend to be shorter-lived.
B. Transferability
A second important design feature of dynamic property taxes is how they
treat the transfer of property. In some jurisdictions, such as California,
assessed values are reset to fair market values when properties are sold.11
Since this means that the current owner may have a much lower ETR for the
property than a potential buyer, this discourages efficient property transfers
and can create “lock-in.”12 Lock-in entrenches outdated patterns of property
ownership, meaning that neighborhood demographics are more likely to be
influenced by anachronistic homeownership preferences than in another
jurisdiction where taxes do not create a wedge between buyer and seller valuations. For example, lock-in might inhibit neighborhood integration that
would otherwise occur because of changing racial preferences.
In other jurisdictions, such as New York City, assessed values are unaffected by property transfers, and the buyer of a property inherits the seller’s
9 Determining Your Assessed Value, supra note 1.
10 If the annual growth rate is g, then a home will hit the five-year cap if (1 + g)5 > 1.2.
This will be true if g is at least 3.71%.
11 See Nada Wasi & Michelle J. White, Property Tax Limitations and Mobility: Lock-in Effect
of California’s Proposition 13, BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON URB. AFFS. 59, 59 (2005).
12 See Fernando Ferreira, You Can Take It with You: Proposition 13 Tax Benefits, Residential
Mobility, and Willingness to Pay for Housing Amenities, 94 J. PUB. ECON. 661, 662 (2010); Keith
R. Ihlanfeldt, Do Caps on Increases in Assessed Values Create a Lock-in Effect? Evidence From
Florida’s Amendment One, 64 NAT’L TAX J. 7, 7–8 (2011); Wasi & White, supra note 11, at
59–60.
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assessment.13 Notionally, this means that the buyer of the property subject to
a cap or phase-in derives a benefit from owning a property with a lower
assessment ratio. Of course, sellers whose property has a favorable assessment ratio should, in theory, be able to charge a higher price in an amount
equal to the present value of the property tax benefit. In jurisdictions like
New York City, identifying the true beneficiaries of dynamic property taxes is
not as simple as looking at the owners of properties with low assessment
ratios. If those owners paid a premium to the seller for the tax benefit, then
the economic beneficiary of the cap or phase-in may be long gone. And
property taxes are generally—if only partially—capitalized in home values
and sales prices.14 In fact, there is evidence that buyers dramatically overpay for short-term property tax benefits, so that property tax benefits are
overcapitalized.15
II. DYNAMICS

OF

NEIGHBORHOOD CHANGE

In this Part, I explore the theoretical racial effects of dynamic property
taxes under gentrification. To understand these effects, we must first understand the racial impacts of property taxes in a static environment because it is
current or expected changes in that environment that drive changes in property values. Many people judge neighborhood “quality” based, in part, on
the racial composition of the neighborhood. They do this either because
they have direct preferences about their neighbors’ race or because they use
race as a proxy for other characteristics of the neighborhood.16 Home prices
should reflect the preferences of those who have the greatest ability to act on
these preferences, and there is evidence that this is likely to be white
homeowners.17
13 See Determining Your Assessed Value, supra note 1; Determining Your Market Value, N.Y.C.
DEP’T OF FIN., https://www1.nyc.gov/site/finance/taxes/property-determining-your-market-value.page (last visited Mar. 2, 2021).
14 See N.Y.C. INDEP. BUDGET OFF., FISCAL BRIEF: AN EFFICIENT USE OF PUBLIC DOLLARS?
A CLOSER LOOK AT THE MARKET EFFECTS OF THE 421-A TAX BREAK FOR CONDOS 2 (2017),
https://ibo.nyc.ny.us/iboreports/an-efficient-use-of-public-dollars-a-closer-look-at-the-market-effects-of-the-421-a-tax-break-for-condos.pdf; Mitchell R. Livy, Intra-School District Capitalization of Property Tax Rates, 41 J. HOUS. ECON. 227, 232–33 (2018); G. Stacy Sirmans,
Dean H. Gatzlaff & David A. Macpherson, The History of Property Tax Capitalization in Real
Estate, 16 J. REAL EST. LITERATURE 327, 340–41 (2008). Property taxes can be very salient
for homebuyers, and there is evidence that they time their purchases to minimize property
tax liability. Sebastien Bradley, Assessment Limits and Timing of Real Estate Transactions, 70
REG’L SCI. & URB. ECON. 360, 370–71 (2018).
15 See generally Sebastien Bradley, Inattention to Deferred Increases in Tax Bases: How Michigan Home Buyers Are Paying for Assessment Limits, 99 REV. ECON. & STAT. 53 (2017).
16 See David R. Harris, “Property Values Drop When Blacks Move in, Because . . .”: Racial and
Socioeconomic Determinants of Neighborhood Desirability, 64 AM. SOCIO. REV. 461, 461–62
(1999). Harris observes larger effects consistent with pure discrimination for owner-occupants than for renters. Id. at 474.
17 For example, there is considerable evidence that brokers “steer” black homebuyers
into certain neighborhoods. See, e.g., Bo Zhao, Jan Ondrich & John Yinger, Why Do Real
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The value of a home depends partly on factors unique to the home
itself, such as the features of the structure and size of the lot. But a home’s
value also depends on factors particular to the neighborhood. Local amenities such as parks, good public schools, and low crime rates will generally
increase homes’ value in the area. The production of these amenities
depends on the allocation of public resources but also on neighborhood
residents’ behavior. A parent considering whether to buy a home zoned for
a particular public school will consider not only the school’s physical plant
and teacher quality, but also the students who attend that school because the
other students may affect the quality of the education that her children will
receive.18 Studies show that a school’s racial composition predicts whether
white parents will choose that school for their children.19 Specifically, white
parents perceive schools with a high proportion of black students as more
dangerous and of lower quality.20
Similarly, a homebuyer worried about crime will consider not only
things like the frequency with which police patrol the area, but also the effect
of the residents themselves on crime. This effect could be negative, if
residents are diligent about monitoring the area and maintaining their
properties, or the effect could be positive, if they neglect their properties or
commit crimes themselves. Homebuyers may think that the racial composition of a neighborhood matters here too. People perceive higher crime rates
in areas with more black residents—particularly young, black, male
residents—even controlling for official crime rates and other neighborhood
characteristics.21 Whites and Latinos overestimate crime in this way more
Estate Brokers Continue to Discriminate? Evidence from the 2000 Housing Discrimination Study, 59
J. URB. ECON. 394, 397, 412 (2006).
18 Cf. Dennis Epple & Richard E. Romano, Peer Effects in Education: A Survey of the Theory and Evidence, in 1B HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL ECONOMICS 1053 (Jess Benhabib, Alberto Bisin
& Matthew O. Jackson eds., 2011), http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/
B9780444537072000037 (surveying models of and empirical support for “peer effects” on
student education outcomes).
19 E.g., Chase M. Billingham & Matthew O. Hunt, School Racial Composition and Parental
Choice: New Evidence on the Preferences of White Parents in the United States, 89 SOCIO. EDUC. 99,
111 (2016) (“As prior studies as well as the analyses presented here indicate, when given a
choice over their children’s educational experience, white parents tend to select schools
with lower proportions of African American students, and they tend to avoid schools with
black majorities in the student body.”).
20 Chase M. Billingham, Shelley M. Kimelberg, Sarah Faude & Matthew O. Hunt, In
Search of a Safe School: Racialized Perceptions of Security and the School Choice Process, 61 SOCIO.
Q. 474, 491 (2020) (“Schools with high proportions of black students are more likely to be
avoided by parents regardless of their security systems . . . .”); Kimberly A. Goyette, Danielle
Farrie & Joshua Freely, This School’s Gone Downhill: Racial Change and Perceived School Quality
Among Whites, 59 SOC. PROBS. 155, 170–76 (2012) (demonstrating correlation between
white parents’ perception of decline in school quality and changes in racial composition,
independent of other factors).
21 Lincoln Quillian & Devah Pager, Black Neighbors, Higher Crime? The Role of Racial
Stereotypes in Evaluations of Neighborhood Crime, 107 AM. J. SOCIO. 717, 718 (2001).
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than blacks do.22 Of course, what matters for home pricing are the beliefs of
the marginal homebuyer about the relationship between neighborhood
demographics and local amenities, regardless of their accuracy.
An alternative channel through which neighborhood demographics may
affect home values is through the neighborhood’s ability to obtain favorable
treatment by the municipal government. Neighborhoods with wealthier
residents or with social networks that include elected officials may be more
effective in obtaining their preferred outcomes when it comes to things like
zoning and traffic rules, obtaining and maintaining public parks, school
funding, and police protection. Residents who share other affinities, such as
race or religion, with local officials may be more effective in having their
concerns addressed. Thus, in addition to the direct effects that neighbors
may have on local amenities, they may also have an indirect effect mediated
by the local government. Neighborhood demographics may affect home values for either of these reasons.
In addition to the effects of local neighborhood composition on amenities, potential entrants may also directly prefer neighbors of a particular race,
age, level of income or educational attainment, and so on. Neighbors may
socialize with each other, work together to solve local problems, and use their
property in ways that affect others’ ability to enjoy their properties. Thus, a
family with children may prefer to live around other families with children to
give their kids playmates, and retirees may prefer to live around other retirees because of similar interests or life experiences or taste for quiet social
activity. Immigrant families may prefer to live close to others from the same
country of origin because of a common language and culture’s social benefits.23 White families may prefer to live in neighborhoods with modest numbers of racial and ethnic minorities because of a taste for diversity or avoid
neighborhoods with minorities because of racial animosity.
If the marginal homebuyer in an area is willing to pay a premium to have
white neighbors—for any reason—then whiteness creates a sort of positive
price externality for those neighbors.24 Given the ubiquity of residential segregation, these neighbors themselves tend to be white, and so racial preferences tend to result in greater housing wealth for white homeowners. The
fact that property values reflect racial preferences is troubling, particularly
because those preferences may be rooted in animus, false beliefs, or white
homeowners’ ability to obtain preferential government treatment. But property taxes do not distinguish between sources of property value. Homeown22 See Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Neighborhood Stigma and the Perception of Disorder, 24 FOCUS 7, 10 (2005).
23 Professor Dorothy Brown has argued that blacks decide to live in majority-minority
neighborhoods even though these neighborhoods appreciate more slowly in value. Dorothy Brown, How Home Ownership Keeps Blacks Poorer than Whites, FORBES (Dec. 10, 2012),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesleadershipforum/2012/12/10/how-home-ownership-keeps-blacks-poorer-than-whites/.
24 This is an example of what Professor Nancy Leong calls “racial capitalism.” Nancy
Leong, Racial Capitalism, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2151 (2013).
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ers are taxed on any value that the market ascribes to the whiteness of its
neighborhood. At least, then, property taxes do not amplify the effect of
racial preferences on wealth distribution.
Dynamic property taxes, however, undermine this result. As a neighborhood gentrifies—becomes whiter—and property values begin to reflect
changing demographics, ETRs fall because of the caps and phase-ins.
Whereas homes in stable white neighborhoods are more valuable and pay
commensurately more in property taxes than homes in majority-minority
neighborhoods, homes in neighborhoods that are rapidly becoming whiter
may pay less in property taxes.25 Who exactly benefits from these lower taxes
depends on the details of that transition.
A. Race and Property Values
Mere correlations between the race of neighborhood residents and
home prices are not, of course, proof of racial preferences in the housing
market. Race is correlated with various other factors, such as income and
education, that may influence how an outsider evaluates a given neighborhood. Although there may not be any study demonstrating the causal effect
of homeowner race on the prices of adjacent properties that would satisfy a
committed skeptic, evidence gathered using different methods and across
geographic locations suggests that neighborhood demographics affect both
home price values and the trajectory of those values over time.
The scholarly literature generally finds that home price growth declines
with the share of black residents in an area. 26 Evidence from Philadelphia,
Atlanta, New Jersey, Milwaukee, and national survey data shows that home
price growth is slowest in neighborhoods that either have predominantly
black residents or where neighborhood demographics are changing so that
black residents are becoming a majority of residents.27 The effect of racial
25 This assumes accurate property appraisals. Often appraisals are not accurate, but I
set this aside to focus on the effect of caps and phase-ins.
26 See, e.g., Chenoa Flippen, Unequal Returns to Housing Investments? A Study of Real
Housing Appreciation Among Black, White, and Hispanic Households, 82 SOC. FORCES 1523, 1544
(2004) (“Increase in black neighborhood representation over time detracts from property
value growth over and above its association with initial minority concentration and change
in poverty composition.”); David A. Macpherson & G. Stacy Sirmans, Neighborhood Diversity
and House-Price Appreciation, 22 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 81, 87 (2001) (“When income and
other variables are included, the level of African American population is not significant [in
Tampa, Florida]. However, the change in percent African American still has a significant
negative effect on price appreciation.”); Richard Moye & Melvin Thomas, Race and Housing
Values: What Happens When Whites Don’t All Move Out?, 17 CITY & CMTY. 109, 120, 124–25
(2018) (finding stable, integrated neighborhoods grow at the fastest rate); Caitlin Knowles
Myers, Discrimination and Neighborhood Effects: Understanding Racial Differentials in US Housing
Prices, 56 J. URB. ECON. 279, 299 (2004) (“House values fall as the percent of blacks in a
neighborhood rises, indicating that high concentrations of blacks may be perceived as a
neighborhood disamenity by some consumers.”).
27 Moye & Thomas, supra note 26, at 124–25 (analyzing Philadelphia); Scott N. Markley, Taylor J. Hafley, Coleman A. Allums, Steven R. Holloway & Hee Cheol Chung, The
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demographics on home price appears variable, with one researcher finding
that the effect of racial minorities on housing price growth is largest as the
share of minorities increases from 0% to 20% of the local population and as
the share increases from 80% to 100% of the local population.28 In the
intermediate range, the effects are more modest.29 Moreover, the effect of
race on home values is probably variable over time. For example, in Southern California, the negative effect of minorities on home prices has declined
in recent years. 30
If there is an effect of a neighborhood’s racial composition on home
price growth, then we would expect that neighborhoods in jurisdictions with
dynamic property taxes that are increasing in their number of white
residents—gentrifying—will have lower ETRs. In rapidly gentrifying neighborhoods, researchers will tend to observe that white homeowners have lower
ETRs than black homeowners. And, in fact, there is evidence from New York
City,31 California,32 and national surveys33 that white homeowners have
lower ETRs because of caps and phase-ins.34
Limits of Homeownership: Racial Capitalism, Black Wealth, and the Appreciation Gap in Atlanta,
44 INT’L J. URB. & REG’L RSCH. 310, 323 (2020); Douglas Coate & Richard W. Schwester,
Black-White Appreciation of Owner-Occupied Homes in Upper Income Suburban Integrated Communities: The Cases of Maplewood and Montclair, New Jersey, 20 J. HOUS. RSCH. 127, 136 (2011);
Sunwoong Kim, Long-Term Appreciation of Owner-Occupied Single-Family House Prices in Milwaukee Neighborhoods, 24 URB. GEOGRAPHY 212, 229–30 (2003); Flippen, supra note 26, at
1544 (analyzing national survey data). Economists have documented large differences in
home price appreciation within cities during housing price booms, with growth being
greatest in lower income areas that are adjacent to high-income neighborhoods. See, e.g.,
Veronica Guerrieri, Daniel Hartley & Erik Hurst, Endogenous Gentrification and Housing Price
Dynamics, 100 J. PUB. ECON. 45, 56 (2013). The direct effects of gentrification also are
largest in low-income neighborhoods. Laura H. Atuesta & Geoffrey J.D. Hewings, Housing
Appreciation Patterns in Low-Income Neighborhoods: Exploring Gentrification in Chicago, 44 J.
HOUS. ECON. 35, 45 (2019).
28 Sunwoong Kim, Race and Home Price Appreciation in Urban Neighborhoods: Evidence from
Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 28 REV. BLACK POL. ECON. 9, 27 (2000).
29 Id.
30 John R. Hipp & Amrita Singh, Changing Neighborhood Determinants of Housing Price
Trends in Southern California, 1960–2009, 13 CITY & CMTY. 254, 268 (2014).
31 Hayashi, supra note 4, at 45–46.
32 DOWELL MYERS, THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF PROPOSITION 13: LARGE DISPARITIES BETWEEN
THE GENERATIONS AND THE UNSUSTAINABLE EFFECTS OF HOUSE PRICES 9 (2009), https://cpbus-e1.wpmucdn.com/sites.usc.edu/dist/6/210/files/2018/08/2009_Myers_Demographics
-Prop-13-1gq3e45.pdf.
33 Isaac William Martin & Kevin Beck, Property Tax Limitation and Racial Inequality in
Effective Tax Rates, 43 CRITICAL SOCIO. 221, 230–31 (2017).
34 Other researchers do not find that race is correlated with favorable assessment
ratios. Id. at 232–33; Mark Skidmore, Charles L. Ballard & Timothy R. Hodge, Property
Value Assessment Growth Limits and Redistribution of Property Tax Payments: Evidence from Michigan, 63 NAT’L TAX J. 509, 522 (2010). But see Bernadette Atuahene, “Our Taxes Are Too
Damn High”: Institutional Racism, Property Tax Assessments, and the Fair Housing Act, 112 NW.
U. L. REV. 1501, 1547–53 (2018); Bernadette Atuahene & Christopher Berry, Taxed Out:
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At the same time, documenting a correlation between low ETRs and
race does not prove that the benefits of dynamic property taxes correlate with
race. The current owner of a property subject to a cap or phase-in may have
purchased the property recently and paid a premium for the tax benefit. As I
illustrate in the next Section, even if home prices depended solely on racial
preferences, dynamic property taxes could negatively or positively correlate
race and ETRs in a gentrifying neighborhood. This depends on the rate of
gentrification, how quickly prices adjust to reflect changing demographics,
and whether the jurisdiction uses caps or phase-ins.
B. Gentrification
To illustrate how dynamic property taxes interact with gentrification and
racial preferences, I describe a very simple process of neighborhood change
in a jurisdiction with a phase-in. The example shows how even the simplest
model of race-based home prices can generate different predictions about
observed correlations between homeowner race and ETRs under a dynamic
property tax. As noted above, these correlations only demonstrate the nominal beneficiaries of dynamic property taxes. Since the benefits of dynamic
property taxes often accrue in neighborhoods with high rates of turnover,
determining the true racial incidence of dynamic property taxes depends on
whether sales prices reflect dynamic tax benefits.
Consider a city composed of a collection of neighborhoods, each of
which has identical homes and only black or only white residents. The price
of a home in the neighborhood depends only on the racial composition.
Specifically, the price of a home is p(1 + w/n), where w is the number of
white residents. The price of a home in a white neighborhood is twice the
price of a home in a black neighborhood. Suppose also that each home is
taxed at rate t, and that the properties in each neighborhood are assessed
only every three years. If housing prices increase from one assessment to the
next, the increase in value is phased in over three years. If neighborhood
demographics are stable, then the ETR in each neighborhood, and for each
resident, is t.
How does gentrification change the racial distribution of the tax burden? The process of gentrification I examine involves the movement of
white residents into a black neighborhood (the “gentrifying neighborhood”),
displacing black residents into other black neighborhoods. Since the movement of black homeowners to other black neighborhoods has no effect on
property values in their new neighborhoods, the movers have a tax rate of t
after moving. The movement of whites out of white neighborhoods does not
affect the prices of homes in the neighborhoods from which they depart, so
the effective tax rate remains t in those neighborhoods. The critical question in understanding the racial impact of dynamic property taxes is the
effective tax rate within the gentrifying neighborhood.
Illegal Property Tax Assessments and the Epidemic of Tax Foreclosures in Detroit, 9 U.C. IRVINE L.
REV. 847, 852–53, 886 (2019).
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Consider first the following extreme case: whites buy all the homes in
the gentrifying neighborhood on the eve of reassessment. The market value
of homes in that neighborhood will double to 2p, but the assessed value of
each home will be (4/3) p in year 1, (5/3) p in year 2, and 2p in year 3. The
ETR for white residents in the gentrified neighborhood will rise from (2/3) t
in year 1 to (5/6) t in year 2 before reaching t in year 3. The displaced black
residents will have an ETR of t in their new homes. Statistical correlations of
race and ETRs will show that whites have lower ETRs.
Of course, gentrification does not happen all at once. The rate of gentrification will affect the observed correlation between homeowner race and
ETRs. Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between the rate of gentrification
and average ETRs over a three-year assessment cycle, by race. The horizontal
axis represents the share of the neighborhood that is gentrified just before
reassessment in year 1. I assume that the rest of the neighborhood is gentrified in equal shares just before assessments are revised upward for years 2
and 3. The vertical axis represents the average ETR for the n white and black
residents who move in and out, respectively, of the gentrifying neighborhood
over the three-year gentrification period.
An important factor affecting ETRs during gentrification is the expectations of buyers and sellers about future demographic change. I consider two
extreme cases. The solid lines in Figure 1 correspond to the (naı̈ve) case
where buyers and sellers expect that the neighborhood’s future
demographics will be the same as its current demographics. The dashed
lines (“RE”) correspond to perfect foresight, so that as soon as gentrification
begins with the first white entrants, everyone knows that the neighborhood
will be entirely white in three years. If market prices adjust instantaneously to
reflect these expectations, then the price of housing will change to 2p.35 In
the case of perfect foresight, fair market values and assessment ratios in the
years after reassessment will be the same as when gentrification happened
instantaneously. The difference is that some of the reduced ETRs in the
neighborhood are enjoyed by black homeowners who have not yet been
displaced.

35 It will actually increase to a little less than 2p, reflecting the fact that the neighborhood is not entirely white yet, but I ignore this modest effect here.
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Figure 1 illustrates that—even if home prices are driven entirely by racial
preferences and neighborhood re-sorting—observed ETRs could be either
higher or lower for white homeowners than black homeowners. If home
prices reflect only current demographics, then black homeowners will always
have higher average ETRs over the three-year assessment cycle than white
homeowners, with the largest gap observed in places with very high or low
initial gentrification rates. But if markets are forward-looking—and they generally are—then only very rapid gentrification will result in white homeowners having lower ETRs than black homeowners. When home prices reflect
anticipated gentrification, more of the beneficiaries of dynamic property
taxes are the black homeowners who have not yet been displaced.
The rate of gentrification also affects how differences in ETRs by race
vary over time. If less than half of a neighborhood is displaced in year 1, then
black homeowners will have a lower average ETR in year 1 than white homeowners, but a higher average ETR than white homeowners in years 2 and 3.
This means that observed correlations between ETRs and race will vary
depending on when those correlations are estimated during the gentrification process.
There are a few takeaways from this analysis. First, gentrification interacts with dynamic property taxes to produce predictable correlations
between ETRs and race. When market prices track the contemporaneous
demographics of a neighborhood, ETRs will tend to be higher for black
homeowners than white homeowners. When prices reflect rational expectations about future demographic change and gentrification happens very
quickly, ETRs will also tend to be higher for black homeowners. Although I
do not analyze them in this Section, in jurisdictions with caps (rather than
phase-ins), even much slower rates of gentrification can result in higher
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ETRs for black homeowners because assessed values may take longer to converge to market values. Recent evidence that black homeowners have higher
ETRs than white homeowners has been explained as a valuation problem:
housing price indices used to calculate market values are too coarse to
account for differences in local public goods between adjacent black and
white neighborhoods.36 Dynamic property taxes provide an alternative
explanation and require an alternative solution.
But the distributional effects are complicated. Even in cases where white
homeowners have lower ETRs than black homeowners, the economic incidence of dynamic property-tax benefits may be shared by displaced black
homeowners when they sell their properties. More evidence is needed about
how property tax benefits are capitalized into sales prices.
Another aspect of the distributional question arises from the nature of
municipal budgets: many local governments set the statutory tax rate on real
property to collect a specified amount of revenue. If assessed values fall, then
these rates go up. Imagine a city composed of one black neighborhood and
one white neighborhood. In equilibrium, the total assessed value of all property in the city is the sum of the market values: n2p + np = 3np and the total
revenue collected is t3np. If all of the residents switched neighborhoods on
the eve of the next property assessment, the aggregate assessed value of property in the city would be n(4/3)p + np = (7/3) np and collecting the same
amount of revenue would require setting a new, higher tax rate t’ = (9/7)t.
Raising the tax rate means that some of the benefits of the phase-in to
white gentrifiers are lost, but it also means that the ETR for black residents
increases. Until assessed values converge to market values, gentrification
results in what is essentially a subsidy from black homeowners to white homeowners. On the other hand, if the tax rate does not increase to compensate
for lower aggregate assessed values, then property tax revenues fall. This
means that the municipality will generally have to cut spending, which will
have its own distributional consequences. 37
Second, the racially disparate impacts of dynamic property taxes raise
important questions about whether these impacts are justifiable because of
other benefits such taxes provide. Any such justification will probably
depend on the reasons for home price growth. For example, if real estate
investors tend to speculate on lower-income, predominantly black neighborhoods, perhaps lower ETRs are justified in those neighborhoods because
property values do not reflect the contemporaneous benefits of living there.
If property appreciation is driven by a change in residents’ behavior, say by
36 Avenancio-León & Howard, supra note 7 (manuscript at 43). The effects of
dynamic property taxes are consistent with the authors’ results. Their analysis assumes that
average assessment ratios should not vary by demographic group within a taxing jurisdiction, and they find that differences in ratios shrink at lower levels of geography. This is
consistent with both differential amenities by neighborhood that are not accounted for in
valuation, and differential growth rates under a dynamic property tax.
37 Local governments are generally prevented from borrowing to finance operating
expenses.
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mobilizing to improve local public safety and school quality, then perhaps
lower ETRs can be justified as a way of encouraging such mobilization.
But in cases where home-price growth is generated by racial preferences,
either because of a re-sorting of individuals across neighborhoods in a process of gentrification or because racial affinities allow certain residents to
obtain preferential treatment by local government that increases home values, then the case for a property tax subsidy falls away. In these cases,
dynamic property taxes exempt—albeit partially and temporarily—property
value attributable to racial preferences. The question then is not just about
how to weigh the disparate impacts of dynamic property taxes, but how to
justify a tax that is based (implicitly) on race and that encourages gentrification. The answer may provide a prima facie case for dynamic property taxes
of the opposite kind: increasing ETRs in rapidly appreciating areas.
III. EVIDENCE

FROM

MARYLAND

I have described in earlier work how New York City’s caps create lower
ETRs in neighborhoods with the highest incomes, the highest turnover, and
the highest share of white residents.38 In this Part, I explore Maryland’s
phase-ins. Maryland reassesses properties on staggered, three-year cycles.
Roughly one-third of the properties in each county are reassessed each
year.39 If a property’s appraised value is lower than its prior appraised value
(determined three years earlier), then it is taxed at its current appraised
value for the next three years. If the property’s appraised value is greater
than its previous appraised value, then the assessed value increases by onethird of the difference each year.40 For example, a property appraised at
$300,000 in 2016 and appraised at $330,000 in 2019 will have an assessed
value of $310,000 in 2019, $320,000 in 2020, and $330,000 in 2021.
A. Data
Figure 2 illustrates the evolution of residential housing prices in Maryland since 1995.41 There was a large run-up until 2008 before the steep
decline associated with the Great Recession’s housing market collapse.
Home prices have increased steadily since 2011. To focus on phase-ins’ benefits, which accrue during periods of price growth, I will focus on two points in
time following periods of growth: 2008 and 2017.
38 Hayashi, supra note 4.
39 This rotating system of assessment means that there is some arbitrariness in property tax liabilities each year, depending on when a property was last assessed. See Andrew
T. Hayashi, Countercyclical Property Taxes, 40 VA. TAX REV. 1, 31–33 (2020).
40 MD. CODE ANN., TAX–PROP. § 8-103(a)(3) (West 2021).
41 All-Transactions House Price Index for Maryland, FED. RSRV. ECON. DATA, https://
fred.stlouisfed.org/series/MDSTHPI (last visited Jan. 19, 2021). Monthly index is based
on Q1 of 1980 being 100.
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To measure the benefits of phase-ins, I use property-level tax records for
the state of Maryland from 2008 to 2017.42 These data include detailed property-level information, including the characteristics of the property, the
assessed value, and the property tax bill. I calculate the tax savings from
phase-ins as the difference between the property taxes actually owed and the
taxes that would be owed if the property were taxed at its market value, determined in the last year of assessment.
Data on neighborhood demographics are from the U.S. Census Bureau.
The time period of the property tax data and the fine-grained level of geography for analysis in my study requires using data from two sources. The fiveyear American Community Survey (ACS) reports demographic characteristics by census block group, a geographical unit of 600 to 2000 people. However, to generate estimates at this level of geography, the ACS samples
households over five years, meaning that the estimates reported for 2017, for
example, reflect data collected from 2013 to 2017 rather than a snapshot in
2017. The five-year ACS is inappropriate for measuring year-to-year changes,
but it can help identify changes over a longer period by comparing versions
that do not overlap. I use the ACS estimates to study block-group
demographics for the 2017 tax year. Since the ACS only began to be published in 2009, I cannot use it to look at demographics for the 2008 tax year.
42 The data were provided by CoreLogic, a commercial provider of real estate data.
The evidence from Maryland that I report below uses administrative data (rather than
survey data on property taxes) and census block group level demographic data. Administrative data are better than survey data because they measures property tax liability with less
error and because such error may be correlated with race because of differential use of
mortgage escrow by race. Andrew T. Hayashi, The Legal Salience of Taxation, 81 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1443, 1480–81 (2014).
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Instead, I use the 2000 and 2010 decennial census to study the changing
demographics around the 2008 tax year.
B. Demographics and Tax Savings
In 2008, the total amount of tax savings in Maryland created by the
phase-in of appreciation for owner-occupied properties was $390.9 million.
For 2017, a year following a period of less dramatic appreciation, the tax
savings totaled $162 million. To estimate the beneficiaries of phase-ins by
race, I allocated the aggregate tax savings within each block group to racial
groups according to their share of the population in that block group, using
the 2010 decennial census for 2008 and the 2017 ACS for 2017. Table 1
compares each racial group’s share of tax savings with their share of the
population.
TABLE 1: SHARES

OF

PHASE-IN BENEFITS

AND

POPULATION

2008

2017

% Savings

% Population

% Savings

% Population

Black

23.4%

28.5%

30.3%

29.4%

White

70.3%

62.7%

55.5%

57.2%

Asian

3.4%

4.6%

6.9%

6.2%

For 2008, I estimate that white residents benefited from phase-ins disproportionately, receiving a little over 70% of the tax savings while making up
62.7% of the population. By 2017, each racial group benefitted in roughly
the same proportion as their population.
Table 2, in the Appendix, reports the racial demographic characteristics
of neighborhoods depending on the median assessment ratio for that neighborhood. For each of 2008 and 2017, I focus on neighborhoods where the
median assessment ratio was less than one and divided the distribution of
median neighborhood assessment ratios into five quintiles. Within each
quintile, I report the median home value and median assessment ratio. I also
report the median population share falling into each of three racial categories corresponding to the tax year an earlier year—ten years earlier in the
case of 2008 and five years earlier in the case of 2017. I have indicated in
light gray (dark gray) if the median population share for a particular racial
group in each quintile increased (decreased) during the interval. The last
row in each panel of the table includes a neighborhood where the median
assessment ratio was one.
Looking at the grayscale coding, one can see that the white population
share has been decreasing while the Asian and black shares have generally
been increasing. For both 2008 and 2017, the neighborhoods with the lowest
assessment ratios were the only ones where the share of black residents had
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declined over the change period. In 2008 that decline was accompanied by
an increase in white population share.
Figure 3 plots the relationship between median neighborhood assessment ratios in 2008 and both the share of white residents in 2010 (on the left
panel) and the change in white residents from 2000 to 2010 (on the right
panel) for each percentile of the distribution. The share of white residents
in 2010 and the increase in white residents from 2000 to 2010 are both negatively correlated with median assessment ratios. But Figure 4 shows the opposite relationship for 2017. Figures 5 and 6 focus on the relationship between
demographics and assessment ratios for appreciating neighborhoods; they
correspond to Figures 3 and 4 but omit neighborhoods where the median
assessment ratio was one. The correlations are the same in three of the four
cases, but for 2008 focusing on growth neighborhoods shows a positive relationship between the share of white residents in 2010 and neighborhood
assessment ratios.
To disentangle the relationship between current demographics and
changing demographics on assessment ratios, Table 3 in the Appendix
reports the estimates from four regression models, corresponding to the data
in Figures 3–6. Each column reports a regression of the median neighborhood assessment ratio on the contemporaneous share of white residents and
the change in the share of white residents over time. Columns 2 and 4
include estimates only for growth neighborhoods, where the median assessment ratio is less than one. The story is consistent across all of the regressions: the contemporary share of white residents is associated with higher
assessment ratios (lower tax savings), but the increase in white residents during the change period is associated with higher rates of home appreciation
and therefore lower assessment ratios, and hence greater tax savings.
CONCLUSION
Although market forces can cause property values to depend on neighborhood demographics, property taxes do not generally amplify the advantages that come from proximity to white homeowners. Property value
derived from racial preferences is taxed like any other source of value. But
many jurisdictions have adopted dynamic property taxes that tax gentrifying
neighborhoods at lower rates than other neighborhoods, encouraging
processes of racial gentrification and raising difficult distributional questions
that previously have been ignored.
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APPENDIX
FIGURE 3: BLOCK GROUP MEDIAN ASSESSMENT RATIOS – 2008

FIGURE 4: BLOCK GROUP MEDIAN ASSESSMENT RATIOS – 2017
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FIGURE 5: BLOCK GROUP MEDIAN ASSESSMENT RATIOS – 2008 (AR < 1)

FIGURE 6: BLOCK GROUP MEDIAN ASSESSMENT RATIOS – 2017 (AR < 1)

Median
FMV
$179,410
$260,040
$268,160
$341,540
$414,120
$295,890

Median
FMV
$256,625
$272,100
$280,000
$276,125
$270,650
$188,400

Median AR
Quintile
1
2
3
4
5

Median
AR
0.911
0.947
0.966
0.978
0.990
1.000

Median
AR
0.758
0.827
0.856
0.876
0.911
1.000

Asian
2017
2.9%
3.8%
3.6%
2.5%
1.4%
1.1%

Asian
2010
0.9%
1.4%
1.6%
1.4%
4.0%
2.1%

OF

2017
Asian
2012
2.9%
2.9%
2.7%
2.4%
1.1%
0.6%
Black
2017
38.3%
18.6%
10.4%
11.8%
8.6%
19.1%

Black
2012
42.6%
18.1%
8.4%
10.0%
8.2%
17.8%

CENSUS BLOCK GROUPS BY ASSESSMENT RATIO
2008
Asian
Black
Black
2000
2010
2000
0.5%
27.3%
32.7%
0.7%
10.5%
7.7%
1.0%
20.9%
17.4%
0.7%
7.9%
6.5%
3.0%
11.2%
8.5%
1.3%
16.3%
15.2%

White
2017
29.6%
61.6%
75.3%
72.3%
81.3%
63.2%

White
2010
62.4%
84.4%
71.3%
85.6%
72.9%
68.1%

White
2012
33.2%
66.1%
77.4%
76.4%
83.7%
67.7%

White
2000
60.2%
87.6%
77.3%
89.3%
81.9%
74.8%
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Median AR
Quintile
1
2
3
4
5

TABLE 2: CHARACTERISTICS
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TABLE 3: PREDICTORS

% White

ȟ % White 2000–2010

Observations
t statistics in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01

1537

CENSUS BLOCK GROUP ASSESSMENT RATIOS
2008
2008 AR<1
2017
2017 AR<1
0.0213**
0.0737**
0.0159**
0.0435**
(3.13)
(9.75)
(8.24)
(14.24)

OF

-0.0744**
(-3.22)

-0.186**
(-6.53)

ȟ % White 2012–2017

Constant

14:55

0.889**
(156.36)
2710

0.776**
(113.36)
1523

-0.0111*
(-2.15)

-0.0300**
(-3.96)

0.968**
(652.67)
3817

0.930**
(395.29)
1969
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